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We study a dynamic coordination process in which agents are uncertain about
the actions of their fellow agents, and anticipate strategically relevant information.
Because of the uncertainty and learning, (ir)reversibility of actions has important
strategic consequences. We find that the reversibility option can either enhance or
hamper efficient coordination, and we characterize the direction of the effect based
solely on simple features of the coordination problem. The analysis is based on the
following generalization of the Laplacian property known from static global games:
agents at the beginning of the dynamic game act as if they were entirely uninformed
about the aggregate play of fellow agents in each stage of the coordination process.
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An agent at the outset of an economic crisis faces strategic uncertainty. She does not
know the future of the economy because she is uncertain how fellow agents perceive the
odds of the crisis and hence how they will react. As the crisis unfolds, the agent receives
strategically valuable information upon which she may reconsider her earlier decisions.
Therefore, her early investment decisions and, at the macroeconomic level, the aggregate
actions and the final outcome of the crisis may crucially depend on the reversibility of
the early actions. The effects of reversibility are complex. On the one hand, reversibility
allows agents to react early to crises, effectively alleviating fears of entry. On the other
hand, reversibility may lead to panic exit waves that deepen the late stages of crises. The
expectation of the panic may exacerbate anticipatory fears.
Our starting observation, that of strategic uncertainty at the outset of crisis, is well
formalized in the global games literature. A global game is a static, incomplete infor-
mation coordination game. Agents receive private signals about an underlying economic
fundamental and, in the unique equilibrium, those with signals above a certain threshold
invest. Our uncertain agent fearing the crisis corresponds to the threshold type who,
being on the boundary between the investing and non-investing types, is uncertain about
the aggregate investment. A key to the solution of static global games is the so-called
Laplacian Property which claims that the belief held by the threshold type is very sim-
ple: she believes that the aggregate investment is distributed uniformly across all feasible
investment levels. To emphasize the connection to Laplace’s principle of insufficient rea-
son, Morris and Shin (2003) dub such a belief Laplacian. In this paper we generalize this
Laplacian property for dynamic environments.
Because of their tractability, static global games are often applied even at the cost
of suppressing dynamic features of the analyzed problem. For example, Morris and Shin
(2004) study debt crises as coordination failures arising among creditors. Treating the
early investments of the creditors as exogenous, they allow them to prematurely withdraw
their funds in the interim stage of the project. The modelled interaction thus becomes
a simultaneous-move game in which investors prefer to withdraw if they believe that
too many fellow investors are withdrawing. The authors apply the static global game
framework and find investors’ panic in the unique equilibrium — a wave of inefficient
interim exits. It is thus natural to ask whether the exit option should be provided, and
at what cost. Such a question requires a dynamic model with endogenous entry decisions
because policies affecting the exit option — the liquidity of investment — will also affect
the entry. This paper provides such framework.
We study a dynamic coordination game in which agents decide whether to invest in
a project consisting of two stages. At the beginning of the first stage, all agents make
a binary investment decision based on their initial private information. During the first
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stage, agents learn additional private information and they can reverse the initial decision
in between the two stages. More precisely, one of the two available actions, investment
(risky action) or no investment (safe action), is irreversible and the other is reversible.
This induces an option value of the reversible action. We call the reversibility of the risky
investment the exit option and reversibility of the safe action the delay option.
We study the effects of the reversibility option by comparing the equilibria of the
dynamic game with that of a benchmark static game without the option. Such a compar-
ison is not straightforward because it has to deal with strategic effects. In non-strategic
decision problems, the reversibility option is unambiguously beneficial, as it allows for
adjustment to the arriving information. However, in strategic environments, reversibility
may lead to fear-driven panic exits or to investment delays. Thus, reversibility may either
hamper or enhance coordination on investment.
The value of the option to reverse early action is an endogenous, equilibrium object
in our model. Our main technical insight is that it can be partially characterized by the
use of the Laplacian property generalized to dynamic games. We find that the threshold
type at the beginning of the game forms an expectation of the option value as if she had
no information about the investment level in the late stage of the project.
Thanks to the generalized Laplacian property, the characterizing of the reversibility
effects becomes simple. As the property holds in both the static and dynamic games,
we need not worry about the differences in the equilibrium beliefs across the two games
and we can evaluate the differences in equilibrium actions based solely on certain simple
mechanistic properties of the investment project.
We find that the strategic consequences of the option depend on the intertemporal
payoff structure. Agents receive profit for each project stage in which they participate
and maximize the total sum of profits. We say that payoffs exhibit forward spillovers if
production involves inertia, such that the profit in the late stage depends not only on the
late but also on the early investment level. Payoffs exhibit backward spillovers if the profit
in the early stage depends not only on the early but also on the late investment level.1
Using this terminology, the effects are as in Table 1: the exit option enhances efficient
coordination in projects with no backward spillovers and hampers efficient coordination
in projects with no forward spillovers. The delay option has the opposite effects. As a
corollary, neither the exit nor the delay option has any effect in projects without both
backward and forward spillovers.
We share a focus on the effects of reversibility options on investment decisions with
McDonald and Siegel (1986) or Dixit and Pindyck (1994), but we differ in the source of
uncertainty. Their work on single-person investment decisions with delay option considers
1Backward spillovers arise, for instance, if agents cannot fully exit the project or under schemes which
redistribute profits among the investors.
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payoff spillovers option to
backward forward exit delay
X × more failures fewer failures
× X fewer failures more failures
× × irrelevance result
Table 1: Effect of the reversibility option on the occurrence of coordination failures.
uncertainty coming from exogenous shocks. In our model, uncertainty is endogenous and
strategic as the agents are uncertain about others’ actions.
Our paper belongs to a booming literature on dynamic global games. One strand of
this literature emphasizes the intertemporal tradeoffs of agents facing frictions in an evolv-
ing environment (Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner 2001, Levin 2001, or Chassang 2010). A
second strand studies public learning in a stable environment and emphasizes equilibrium
multiplicity induced by observation of an endogenously chosen public policy (Angeletos,
Hellwig, and Pavan 2006), observation of prices (Angeletos and Werning 2006), or obser-
vation of earlier coordination outcomes (Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan 2007).
Our paper also belongs to yet another stream of dynamic global games literature in
which the environment is fixed, but the reversibility option has a value induced by learn-
ing (Heidhues and Melissas 2006, Dasgupta 2007, and Dasgupta, Steiner, and Stewart
2012). The learning is private, and hence equilibrium uniqueness is preserved, which facil-
itates the characterization of the reversibility effects. The generalized Laplacian property
described in this paper unifies this characterization across a large class of settings without
resorting to specific payoff functions and error distributions assumed in the above papers.
One of the dynamic effects studied in the literature but not addressed here is that
investment by one agent can trigger investment of her fellow agents either through signal-
ing or via complementarities (see Corsetti, et al. 2004 or Hörner 2004 within the global
games literature, and Chamley and Gale 1994, Gale 1995, or Gul and Lundholm 1995
outside of the global games literature). Our model abstracts from informational exter-
nalities as we assume that the amount of information revealed during the coordination
process is independent of agents’ actions. Moreover, our agents are small and therefore
cannot individually trigger the investments of others.
Our model provides an added value in situations in which strategic uncertainty plays a
central role. For a better illustration, let us compare our approach to that of Gale (1995).
He considers a small population of agents with irreversible investment and a delay option.
Under perfect observability of actions, agents can coordinate efficiently, as each agent is
eager to invest early in order to induce the investments of others. In large populations,
when individual actions are not observable and agents are uncertain of aggregate actions,
our model predicting inefficient coordination may be a better fit.
Questions on the timing of the exit similar to ours have also been studied outside of
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the global games literature. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) devise a model that explains
the persistence of asset bubbles and Brunnermeier and Morgan (2010) analyze delay in
clock games (a class of games where an agent’s payoff depends on the time of exit). The
methodology used in both these papers, however, differs from ours in that their models
do not exhibit strategic complementarities.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model; Section
3 contains the main technical contribution of the paper — it describes the generalized
Laplacian property in dynamic games. The Laplacian property holds in a monotone,
symmetric strategy profile, and indeed in Section 4 we prove that the game exhibit
unique monotone, symmetric equilibrium, making thus the Laplacian property applicable.
Section 5 identifies the strategic effects of the reversibility option by comparing equilibria
across the dynamic game and the static benchmark. Section 6 contains a brief extension
to settings with multiple rounds. In Section 7 we discuss our modeling assumptions.
Most of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
We study a dynamic, binary-action game with one of the two actions being reversible and
the other irreversible. For the sake of concreteness we focus on the game with reversible
investment — on the game with exit option. The analysis of the game with reversible



































































Figure 1: Decision tree in the dynamic game Γdyn (left) and in the benchmark static
game Γst (right). Moves of Nature and of fellow agents are not depicted.
There is a common investment project with two production stages and continuum of
agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each production stage is preceded by agents’ investment
decisions. Before the first stage, in round 1, all agents simultaneously choose between
entering the project, ai1 = 1 (also called investing, or risky action), or not investing,
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ai1 = 0 (safe action). Agents who chose the safe action, a
i
1 = 0, reach their final node
and receive a payoff 0. Entrants make a new decision in between the two production
stages — in round 2. They choose simultaneously whether to exit or stay in the project,
ai2 ∈ {0, 1}. Let l1 denote the measure of agents choosing a
i
1 = 1 in round 1, and l2 the
measure of agents choosing action 1 in both rounds, ai1 = a
i
2 = 1.
The payoffs depend on three components: economic fundamental θ, aggregate invest-
ment in the first round l1, and aggregate investment in the second round l2. The payoff
for investing and exiting, (a1, a2) = (1, 0), is u1(θ, l1, l2). The payoff for investing and
staying, (a1, a2) = (1, 1), is u1(θ, l1, l2) + u2(θ, l1, l2). We interpret u1 and u2 as payoffs
for participation in stage 1 and 2. They are real-valued functions, defined on the domain
{(θ, l1, l2) ∈ R× [0, 1]× [0, 1] : l2 ≤ l1}. Both payoff functions are continuous in all argu-
ments.2 The additive payoff structure is without loss of generality. To avoid ambiguity
in exposition, we assume that indifferent types choose action 1.
We now impose payoff restrictions common in the global games literature under which
both the static and the dynamic game exhibit unique symmetric, monotone equilibrium.
In particular, we assume that for t = 1, 2 the following assumptions are satisfied.
A1 Strict State Monotonicity: ut(θ, l1, l2) is increasing in θ.
A2 Weak Action Monotonicity: ut(θ, l1, l2) is non-decreasing in l1 and l2.
A3 Dominance Regions: ut(θ, 1, 1) < 0 for all θ < θ + 3σ and ut(θ, 0, 0) > 0 for all
θ > θ − 3σ.
Based on A1, we can interpret the fundamental θ as a quality of the project: higher
fundamentals are associated with higher payoffs. Assumption A2 imposes strategic com-
plementarities: investing by any agent in any round increases the incentive to invest for
other agents in both rounds. Assumption A3 assures that in both stages of the dynamic
and the static game, agents with very high signals participate in the project and those
with very low signals do not participate.3,4
Agents have heterogeneous private information: Nature draws the (common) funda-
mental θ from a uniform distribution on Θ = [θ, θ] ⊂ R. We discuss the role of the
uniform prior in Section 7 and conjecture that in the limit of precise signals our results
remain valid under a non-uniform prior. At the beginning of rounds t = 1, 2, each agent
i observes a private signal
xit = θ + ση
i
t.
2The results can be extended to allow for isolated payoff discontinuities such as those used in games
of regime change. Static games of regime change are used to model currency attacks (Morris and Shin
1998), bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner 2005) or revolutions (Edmond 2008). The attack in these
models succeeds if its size exceeds a critical level.
3Assumption A3 can be weakened. See the working version of this paper, Kováč and Steiner (2008).
4For some results (in Section 5) we consider σ → 0. Note that if Assumption A3 holds for some σ̄ > 0,
then it also holds for all σ ∈ (0, σ̄).
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The vector of errors (ηi1, η
i
2) is i.i.d. across agents, independent of θ and distributed
according to a continuous joint distribution with a compact convex support H ⊆ [−1, 1]2.
The errors are not required to be independent across rounds, though errors independent
across time are a special case of the setting.5 Opponents’ actions are unobserved, but
we can reinterpret the exogenous signals xi2 in round 2 in terms of social learning, see
Section 7. There is no aggregate uncertainty: the realized population of errors is identical
to their joint density.
Bold letter xi = (xi1, x
i
2) denotes the type (signal pair) of agent i. The type set is
X = {(x1, x2) : ∃θ ∈ R and ∃(η1, η2) ∈ H such that (x1, x2) = (θ + ση1, θ + ση2)} ;
it is the union of all diagonal translations of the error support H scaled by σ, see Figure
2. Notice that the type set X is larger than the support of types, as X contains also
types derived from θ ∈ R \ Θ. With these redundant types included, the type set X
is translation-invariant, which will simplify discussion and notation. We use the usual
incomplete product order ≤ to compare the types. A (pure) strategy is a pair of functions
s = (s1, s2) with s1 : R −→ {0, 1}, s2 : X −→ {0, 1}. Abusing terminology and notation,
we also call signal xi1 in round 1 a type, and action rule s1(x
i







Figure 2: Support of errors and the type space.
Our main applied result, presented in Section 5, characterizes the effect of the re-
versibility option on the coordination outcome. To that end we compare the above
dynamic game Γdyn with a benchmark static game Γst which differs from Γdyn only in
the lack of the reversibility option: each agent can move only in round 1; once an agent
invests in round 1, she must stay in the project in round 2; see Figure 1. To facilitate the
comparison with the dynamic game, we keep the lower index 1 when describing the signal
5In Section 5 we further restrict error distribution, ruling out independent errors. There we require
that the first signal is an uninformative coarsening of the second signal.
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xi1 or strategy s1(x
i
1) in the static game despite it having only one non-trivial round.
3 The Laplacian Property
We now discuss how the model captures strategic uncertainty. Consider a symmetric,
monotone strategy profile under which an agent in round 1 enters if and only if her signal
xi1 exceeds a threshold x
∗
1. We analyze the beliefs and expectations of the threshold type
x∗1. This type, being uncertain about the actions of others as well as about her own
future action, embodies strategic uncertainty of the economic agent in the midst of a
regime change. Moreover, understanding beliefs and expectations of the threshold type
is essential for the equilibrium characterization, as the analysis relies on the indifference
condition imposed on the type x∗1.
In the next subsection, we review Morris and Shin (2003), who have described the
beliefs of the threshold type in a simultaneous-move game. Then, in Subsection 3.2, we
generalize the Laplacian property to the dynamic game under assumptions P1–3 imposed
on endogenous objects. Later on, in Section 4, we prove that the assumptions A1–3,
imposed on exogenous objects, imply that P1–3 are satisfied in the unique equilibrium.
3.1 Belief about the First-round Aggregate Action
Let s1(x
i
1) be a monotone strategy in either the static or in the first round of the dynamic
game. Denote the threshold signal by x∗1, and let L1 = {x : x1 ≥ x
∗
1} be the set of
types investing in round 1. The symmetric strategy profile s1 induces a non-decreasing
function l1(θ) specifying aggregate investment for each realization of θ. In the absence of
aggregate uncertainty, l1(θ) is the probability that an agent j invests:
l1(θ) = Pr
(
xj ∈ L1 | θ
)
.
The following theorem describes belief of the threshold type about the first-round
action:
Theorem 1 (Laplacian Property). (Morris and Shin 2003)
The threshold type has no information about the aggregate action: the distribution of the
conditional random variable l1(θ) | x
∗
1 is uniform on [0, 1].
For convenience, we provide the proof in the Appendix.
The intuition is as follows. The threshold type x∗1, being on the boundary between the
investing and the non-investing types, is uncertain about the realized proportion of agents
to the right of the boundary (the investing types). This proportion is determined by the
rank of her signal x∗1 within the realized population of signals. The only information
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she receives is her own signal, which is, due to the uniform prior, entirely uninformative
about her rank, and therefore about the aggregate investment. Thus, she form uniform
beliefs about the aggregate action.
Before we focus on the dynamic setting, we briefly discuss how the Laplacian belief
determines equilibrium behavior in the static game. Consider a specification with very
precise signals, σ being small. In this case, the agents know that the fundamental θ is
close to their private signals xi1. In particular, the threshold type x
∗
1 knows that θ ≈ x
∗
1,
and she has the uniform belief about the aggregate action. As the threshold type is
indifferent across the two available actions, it satisfies:
0 = E
[















which (approximately) determines the unique monotone, symmetric equilibrium. See
Section 4 for details.
3.2 Laplacian Expectations in the Dynamic Game
The belief about the first-round aggregate action does not fully determine the equilibrium
of the dynamic game. To impose the indifference condition on the threshold type x∗1, we
need to examine her beliefs about the both stages of the project.
We fix a symmetric strategy profile s = (s1, s2), and impose the following properties:




is non-decreasing in d.
P2 Extreme Behavior: s(x) = (0, 0) for x ≤ (θ + 2σ, θ + 2σ), and s(x) = (1, 1) for
x ≥ (θ − 2σ, θ − 2σ).
As we will prove in Section 4, A1–3 imply that the two properties are satisfied in the
unique equilibrium. We maintain notation x∗1 for the threshold signal in round 1, and let
L1 and L2 = {x : s1(x1) = s2(x) = 1} denote the sets of types that invest in the first and
in both rounds, respectively; see Figure 3 for illustration. Symmetric strategy profile s
induces a pair of investment profiles — non-decreasing functions lt(θ) = Pr (x
j ∈ Lt | θ)
that specify the investment levels in rounds t = 1, 2 for each realization of θ. Out of
the triple of variables θ, l1, l2 we can choose any one as the independent one and express
the remaining two variables as its non-decreasing functions. We abuse the notation by
denoting those functions θ(lt), l1(l2), and l2(l1).
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Our long-term aim is to find equilibrium threshold signal x∗1 above which agents enter
the project in the first round and below which they stay out. We will characterize x∗1 only
6Both l1(θ) and l2(θ) are non-decreasing. Thus, their inverse functions may not be uniquely defined
for countably many values of l. We can choose any value of θ from the preimage {θ : lt(θ) = l} without
















Figure 3: Illustration of the sets L1 (types who enter in round 1) and L2 (types who enter
in round 1 and stay in round 2).
in the next section. In this section we focus on the payoff expectations of the threshold
type.
We start by discussing behavior in the continuation game in round 2. We constrain
for this section all agents to a possibly non-equilibrium, exogenous threshold x∗1 in round
1, and examine equilibrium of the continuation game: denote the expected continuation
payoff of type x in round 2 by U2(x) = E [u2(θ, l1, l2) | x], omitting from the notation
that U2 depends on the strategy s via mappings between θ, l1, and l2. We impose a third
property in this section that requires the agents to follow an equilibrium strategy of the
continuation game:
P3 Optimality in the Continuation Play: s2(x) = 1 if and only if U2(x) ≥ 0.
Let us now return to round 1. We write Dt for the expected payoff for stages t = 1, 2
as expected in round 1 by the threshold type x∗1:
7
D1 = E [u1(θ, l1, l2) | x
∗







Let us interpret the term D2. Recall that s2(x
i) = 1 when the agent stays in round
2 and s2(x
i) = 0 when she exits in round 2. In round 1, the agent anticipates her own
optimal behavior s2(x
i) in round 2, which is contingent on the yet unreceived signal xi2.
Thus, D2 is the value of the option to participate in the second stage, as evaluated in
round 1.
The following theorem is the central technical insight of the paper. It states that the
option value D2 equals a simple payoff expectation of an agent who has no information
about the aggregate action in round 2, and who is committed to stay in the project:
7Again, the profile s and the mutual dependence of θ, l1, and l2 are omitted from the notation.
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Theorem 2 (Generalized Laplacian Property).
Payoff expectations formed by threshold type x∗1 in round 1 are equal to expectations formed
















The expression for D1 is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1, by which the threshold
type x∗1 in round 1 has the uniform belief about l1. The characterization of D2 is, however,
not immediate. To see the intricacies, let us discuss a direct computation of the option
value D2.
The threshold type x∗1 first computes the probability that she stays in the project
upon receiving xi2, and then forms beliefs about aggregate actions conditional on stay-
ing. Such conditional beliefs are complicated as they reflects both the exogenous error
distributions and the endogenous strategy profile. The advantage of Theorem 2 is that
it circumvents the computation of such beliefs. The simple integral in (1), based on the
uniform distribution of l2 instead of the complicated conditional distribution, gives the
correct value of D2. The error distributions and the strategy profile still influence D2 but
they are summarized by the functions θ(l2) and l1(l2) that relate the fundamental and
the investment levels in rounds 1 and 2. Theorem 2 is useful despite that the functions
θ(l2), l1(l2) may be complicated, because the theorem will allow us to make predictions
independent of these mappings; see Section 5.
We prove Theorem 2 in two auxiliary lemmas. In Lemma 1 we transform the agent’s
advantage arising from the exit option into an advantage arising from modified infor-
mation. Transforming the original dynamic problem into a static one with the modified
information is useful; known results on static global games do not accommodate our dy-
namic setting, but they are robust with respect to the information structure. Indeed, in
Lemma 2, we recognize that the transformed problem is a static problem in which the
known static Laplacian property, Theorem 1, holds.8
Before formulating the lemmas, we amend the notation. The new notation, though it
is more complex, will highlight similarities between the terms D1 and D2. We say that
S ⊂ X is a diagonally monotone set, if it satisfies the following two properties: (i) if
x ∈ S, then x+ (d, d) ∈ S for all d ≥ 0. (ii) For any x ∈ X there exists d ≥ 0 such that
x − (d, d) /∈ S and x + (d, d) ∈ S. Notice that sets L1 and L2 are diagonally monotone
by P1–2.
8Similar proof technique has been used in Sákovics and Steiner (2012) who analyze a static global
game with heterogenous population. They map the original problem to a virtual static homogenous
problem, achieving thus a partial characterization of the original strategic beliefs.
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We define (diagonal) boundary of a diagonally monotone set S as
∂S = {x ∈ X : x+ (d, d) ∈ S and x− (d, d) /∈ S for all d > 0}.
Recall that L1 is the set of types with x1 ≥ x
∗
1; see also Figure 3. Therefore, the informa-
tion of an agent who has received signal x∗1 in round 1 is equivalent to the information
that her type x belongs to the boundary ∂L1.
We can rewrite D1 and D2 as







where we write E[ξ|S] for the expectation of a random variable ξ conditional on the
event that type xi ∈ S, and define E[ξ|∂S] as limd→0 E[ξ|∂S
d], where ∂Sd = {x ∈ X :
x− (d′, d′) ∈ ∂S for some d′ ∈ [−d, d]}.9









Figure 4: Lemma 1. Exiting types on ∂L1 are replaced by indifferent types on ∂L2.
Lemma 1. If strategy s satisfies P1–3 then
D2 = E [u2 (θ, l1, l2) | ∂L2] . (3)
The lemma expresses D2 without the computational intricacies caused by the exit option.
D2 equals the expectation of an agent committed to stay in round 2, whose information
is modified. Instead of the boundary of L1, she conditions on being on the boundary of
L2. The lemma states that this change in information precisely compensates for the lost
option.
9We assume that S is such that ∂Sd occurs with a positive probability for small enough d.
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The modification of agent’s information is depicted in Figure 4: The exiting types
on ∂L1 are replaced by the investing but indifferent types on ∂L2. Such replacement
transforms the original option value in (2) into the payoff expectation conditional on
∂L2 of an agent who never exits in round 2 — into (3). To see this, consider a type
(x∗1, x2). Whether this type invests in round 2 depends on her signal x
i
2 in round 2. The
investing types belong to the boundary ∂L2. The types who exit receive 0 second stage
payoff. Consider an exiting type (x∗1, x2) and replace it by its diagonal translation x̃ that
lies in ∂L2; x̃ = (x
∗
1, x2) + (d, d) such that x̃ ∈ ∂L2. Type x̃ satisfies the indifference
condition in round 2, and thus also receives the same expected payoff U2(x) = 0 (this is
where the optimality of the continuation strategy is used in the argument). Therefore,
the replacement preserves the payoff of the original exiting type. It remains to show that
the relative probability of the unreplaced types is the same for the both boundaries L1
and L2. We show in the Appendix that this follows from a translational symmetry of the
assumed signal distribution.
Consider a diagonally monotone set S, and let lS(θ) = Pr (x
j ∈ S | θ) generalize the
investment profile functions lt(θ). The following lemma is a generalization of the static
Laplacian property; for S = L1 it replicates Theorem 1.











Figure 5: Lemma 2. Diagonal translations of ∂S. The information that an agent’s type
is on the boundary of S is uninformative of the realized proportion of agents above the
boundary.
Recall the intuition from the static game. Again, the information that the agent’s type
is somewhere on the boundary of S is entirely uninformative of the realized proportion
lS(θ) of agents above the boundary. To show this formally, we reduce the dimensionality
of the problem in the proof. We introduce diagonal translations of ∂S and label them in
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a monotonic way as illustrated in Figure 5.10 We call the labels virtual one-dimensional
signals x̃i, and denote the label of ∂S by x̃∗. Belief lS(θ) | ∂S is then identical to the
belief of the virtual threshold type x̃∗ about the measure of agents with x̃i ≥ x̃∗. It is the
strategic belief of the threshold type in the static setting — the static Laplacian property,
Theorem 1, applies.
Having established Lemmas 1 and 2, the proof of Theorem 2 becomes straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 1, Dt = E [ut(θ, l1, l2) | ∂Lt]. Lemma 2 with S spec-
ified as Lt gives that lt|∂Lt is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Combined, this implies
generalized Laplacian property (1).
4 Symmetric Monotone Equilibrium
Before proceeding to the dynamic game, we first review the result in Morris and Shin
(2003) for the static game. For each candidate x∗1 ∈ R for the equilibrium threshold,
consider type x∗1’s incentive to invest. That is, consider symmetric monotone strategy
profile s1 with the threshold x
∗
1, and for t = 1, 2 let
St (x
∗
1) = E [ut(θ, l1, l1) | x
∗
1]
be the expectations of the stage-t payoff formed by the threshold type x∗1 in the static
game. We say that x∗ ∈ R is a root of a function m : R −→ R, if m(x) < 0 for x < x∗ and
m(x) > 0 for x > x∗ for x in some neighborhood of x∗.11 The equilibrium value of the




1) = S1 (x
∗
1) + S2 (x
∗
1) .
By the state monotonicity A1, the function mst is increasing, and the dominance regions
assure that it attains both positive and negative values. Thus, mst has a root and the
static game has a unique monotone, symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Let us now overview the analysis in the dynamic setting. Consider a symmetric
strategy profile (s1, s2) where s1 is a threshold strategy with the threshold x
∗
1. Similar to








10As S is diagonally monotone, set of all diagonal translations of ∂S form a partition of X.
11We use the definition of a root in this generalized sense, as below we work with functions for which
we have established strict monotonicity but not continuity. If such a function attains both positive and
negative values, the equation m(x) = 0 may not have a solution, but it has a unique root in the sense
defined above.
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to be the payoff expectation of the threshold type x∗1 in round 1 of the dynamic game under
the profile s. Again, the equilibrium threshold type x∗1 is the root ofmdyn. To definemdyn :
R −→ R as an unambiguous function of its argument x∗1, we specify the continuation
strategy s2 as a function of x
∗
1. It is an equilibrium strategy in the continuation game:
for each value of the threshold x∗1, we consider the continuation game Γ2(x
∗
1) induced
from Γdyn by the first round threshold x
∗
1; agents must follow threshold x
∗
1 in round 1 of
Γ2(x
∗
1) and only choose the continuation strategy s2(x
i). Thus, Γ2(x
∗
1) is a static Bayesian
game. We prove in Appendix that Γ2(x
∗
1) has a unique equilibrium for each value of x
∗
1.
Additionally, we prove the monotonicity of mdyn.
Lemma 3. Function mdyn(x
∗
1) is well-defined, increasing, and has a unique root.
The unique root of mdyn(x
∗
1) and the induced continuation strategy s2 constitute the
unique symmetric monotone equilibrium of the dynamic game. The following proposition
proposition summarizes the results.12
Proposition 1. The dynamic game has a unique symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equi-
librium. The equilibrium threshold in the first round, x∗1, is the unique root of the function
mdyn. The equilibrium strategy satisfies properties P1–3.
5 Strategic Effects of Reversibility
In this section we return to our applied question. We characterize the strategic effects
of the exit option by comparing equilibrium behavior across the dynamic and the static
game. We identify conditions under which the option hampers or enhances coordination
on the risky investment.
We proceed by comparing functions mst and mdyn. Consider, for instance, a situation




1) for all x
∗
1. Then entry is an equilibrium action
in round 1 on a larger set of types x1 in the dynamic game than in the static game —
the exit option enhances coordination on entry.
The comparison of the two functions,
mst (x
∗
1) = S1 (x
∗
1) + S2 (x
∗
1) and mdyn (x
∗





would be difficult to establish by a direct computation as both the beliefs and the aggre-
gate actions differ across the static and the dynamic game. We conduct the comparison
using the Laplacian property; it assures that the expectations of the threshold types are
based on the uniform beliefs in both games. The property allows for an unambiguous
comparison of the terms St and Dt:
12Proposition 1 can be strengthened. As we show in the working paper Kováč and Steiner (2008), the




























Proof. (i) Using the Laplacian property (Theorem 1) we can write both sides as expec-




















The two integrals differ only in the third argument of u1.
13 The inequality follows from the
monotonicity of u1 and from the fact that l1 ≥ l2. The last inequality is a technological
constraint reflecting that agents can exit the project but cannot join it in the second
round.
(ii) Similarly, by Theorem 2, we can write both sides as expectations based on the




















In this case, the two integrals differ in the first and second argument of u2. For the
second argument, we again use the inequality l2 ≤ l1 and the monotonicity of u2. For the
first argument, we use the monotonicity of u2 with respect to θ, and inequality θ
st(l2) ≤
θdyn(l2). The last inequality is established as follows. The functions θ
st(l2) and θ
dyn(l2)
are defined as inverse functions to l1(θ) = Pr (x
i ∈ L1 | θ) and l2(θ) = Pr (x
i ∈ L2 | θ),
respectively. The two functions are non-decreasing and, as L1 ⊇ L2, l1(θ) ≥ l2(θ). Thus,
the opposite inequality holds for the inverse functions.




1 | θ) in both games. Thus, the inverse function θ(l1) is identical across
the two games as well.
16
We call inequalities (i) and (ii) the first and the second stage effects. The two effects
are of opposite signs and therefore a comparison of mst and mdyn is possible only if we
impose further structure on the model:
Definition 1. We say that the payoffs do not exhibit
1. backward spillovers if u1(θ, l1, l2) does not depend on l2.
2. forward spillovers if u2(θ, l1, l2) does not depend on l1.
The absence of either backward or forward spillovers allows to characterize the strate-
gic effect of reversibility. Assume first that payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers.

















1) by the second stage effect, as on Figure 6. Therefore, in
the absence of backward spillovers, the exit option enhances entry: agents enter in the
dynamic game on a larger set of first-round signals x1 than in the static game.
The result is reversed if payoffs do not exhibit forward spillovers. Let us explain
the argument informally in the limit of small errors. When σ is small then x1 ≈ θ. In















1) by the first stage effect. Thus, the exit option hampers
coordination on entry. In this case, though the exit option allows agents to react to the
arriving information, this valuable flexibility is exceeded by the fear of a panic-based exit
wave.
We will formalize these observations in the limit of precise signals, σ → 0. In such a
limit, the fundamental uncertainty becomes negligible, xi1 ≈ x
i
2 ≈ θ, and the analysis can
focus on the strategic uncertainty of the threshold type, which remains large. Formally,
we examine sequences of the static and the dynamic games with varying scale of noise
σ. The corresponding games are denoted by Γst(σ) and Γdyn(σ), whereas Γst and Γdyn
without the argument denote in this section classes of games (Γ(σ))σ. We now introduce
a new terminology that describes local equilibrium behavior in the limit of precise signals.
Definition 2. We say that action path h ∈ {0, 10, 11} is selected at θ in Γst, respectively
in Γdyn if there exists σ > 0 such that for all σ ∈ (0, σ] all agents in Γst(σ), respectively
in Γdyn(σ), reach action path h whenever Nature draws the fundamental θ and all agents
follow the unique monotone, symmetric equilibrium profile.
14When ut does not depend on lt′ , we drop the relevant argument.
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Naturally, only action histories 0 or 11 can be selected in the static game.
The next definition will allow us to focus on cases in which the second-round behavior
is non-trivial.




u2(θ, 1, l2)dl2 > 0.




u2(θ, 1, l2)dl2 < 0. We will show that agents cannot coordinate on staying in
the project even under the best possible scenario. The intuition is as follows. To make
the second stage as attractive as possible, suppose that the first stage of the project
is compulsory, l1 = 1. The game, effectively collapsing to the second stage decisions,
becomes a static game. Given the assumed inequality, action 0 is selected in this static




u2(θ, 1, l2)dl2 < 0, all agents expect in round 1 of the dynamic game that they
will exit in round 2. Thus, the dynamic game essentially simplifies into a static game
consisting of only the first round. As analysis of the exit option then reduces to a simple
comparison of two static global games, we omit such cases.
We impose two additional, technical assumptions:
A4 Strict Action Monotonicity in Round 2: u2(θ, l1, l2) is increasing in l2.
A5 Restriction on Error Distributions: ηi1 − η
i
2 is independent of η
i
2.









16 Thus the optimal strategy in round
2 depends only on xi2 and not on x
i
1. One-dimensionality of the continuation strategy
simplifies the proofs of the limit results below, but we conjecture that the results hold
for a large family of other error structures as well.
We are now ready to state the main applied results. The exit option enhances coordi-
nation on investment in the absence of backward spillovers. The effect is reversed when
payoffs do not exhibit forward spillovers. Assume for the next two propositions and for
the corollary that strategic uncertainty permits investment at θ in round 2.
Proposition 2. If payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers, then the exit option
enhances investment:
(i) If action path 11 is selected at θ in Γst, then 11 is selected at θ in Γdyn.







16Assumption A5 is also used in the existing literature (see, for example, Heidhues and Melissas 2006).
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(ii) If 0 is selected at θ in Γdyn, then 0 is selected at θ in Γst.
Proposition 3. If payoffs do not exhibit forward spillovers, then the exit option ham-
pers investment:
(i) If action path 11 is selected at θ in Γdyn, then 11 is selected at θ in Γst.
(ii) If 0 is selected at θ in Γst, then 0 is selected at θ in Γdyn.
Let us remark that Proposition 2 can be extended to settings with any σ > 0, whereas
the result in Proposition 3 holds only for the vanishing σ. This is because Proposition
2 is based on (6) which holds for any σ, while Proposition 3 is driven by (7) that holds
only for vanishing σ.
A simple corollary of the last two propositions is that in the absence of both spillovers,
the provision of the exit option does not change the coordination outcome.
Corollary 1. If payoffs do not exhibit forward nor backward spillovers, then the same
action path is selected at θ in Γst and Γdyn.
5.1 Example
We use an example to illustrates two seemingly contradicting features of the model. (i)
The strategic effect of the exit option is typically large — the option changes equilibrium
behavior with positive ex ante probability even for vanishing σ. Yet, (ii) the direct effect
of the exit option is negligible — the ex ante probability that the option is used vanishes
as σ → 0.











2 are independent. Let the distribution of
ηi∆ be uniform on [−1, 1], and the distribution of η
i
2 uniform on [−ε, ε], where 0 < ε ≪ 1.
The payoff functions are




These payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers and so, by Proposition 2, the exit option
enhances investment. Thus, we can conclude without detailed computations that, in this
case, entry is selected on a weakly larger set of θ in the dynamic than in the static game.
Detailed computation reveals that the effect is strict. That is, as σ → 0, entry is selected
on a strictly larger set of θ in the dynamic than in the static game.
The two depicted functions in Figure 6 illustrate mdyn and mst for this particular
specification. Their computation is based on the first- and the second-round indifference
conditions imposed on thresholds x∗1 and x
∗
2. The two thresholds specify the mappings
between θ, l1 and l2, and the mappings, together with the Laplacian property, in turn
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fully specify the functions mst and mdyn. See Kováč and Steiner (2008) for detailed
computation of mst and mdyn.
We first discuss the feature (i). The functions mdyn and mst are depicted in Figure 6
in the limit, as σ → 0. The difference between the roots of the two functions does not
disappear in the limit. Thus, the strategic consequence of the exit option is large in the
sense, that the interval of θ at which entry is selected in the dynamic but not in the static
game has a positive ex ante probability.
Let us now discuss (ii). We have verified for this specification that strategic uncer-
tainty permits investment at θ in round 2 for all θ above the root of mdyn. We show in
the Appendix (Lemma 9) that in such a case entry followed by exit is never selected. For
all θ above the root x∗1 of mdyn entry and staying in the project is selected, while for θ
below the root not investing is selected.
To reconcile (i) and (ii), recall that a player with the first-round signal x∗1 exercises the
exit option with a positive probability, because she suffers from large strategic uncertainty
and her beliefs may shift from optimistic to pessimistic in between the rounds 1 and 2.
While exiting types are rare ex ante, the exit option has a large strategic impact. This is
because the pivotal equilibrium condition — the indifference condition — is imposed on





as σ → 0.
Why does the exit option enhance investment in this case? The first-stage effect
disappears, as the type x∗1 has an identical belief about l1 across the both games, and u1
does not depend on l2. The second stage effect is non-vanishing; the type x
∗
1 is (precisely,
behaves as if it was) more optimistic about l1 in the dynamic than in the static game.
In both games, the type x∗1 “has” uniform belief about l2, but in the static game l1 = l2,
while in the dynamic game l1 > l2.
6 Extension: Laplacian Property for Many Rounds
This section generalizes the Laplacian Property to more than two rounds. Following
the description of the model in Section 2, consider an investment project with T ∈ N
production stages and agents having the option to exit before every stage. The agent




uτ (θ, l1, l2, . . . , lT ),
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where lt is the measure of agents who are still active after round t.
17 The agent who does
not participate in the project at all (exists in round 1) obtains a payoff 0.
At the beginning of each round t = 1, 2, . . . , T , before making the exit/stay decision,
every agent i observes a private signal xit = θ+ση
i
t with errors having the same properties
as in Section 2. The type set X ⊆ RT is, as in the baseline model, the union of all
diagonal translations of the error support (scaled by σ). Strategy is a vector of functions
s = (s1, . . . , sT ), where st : X −→ {0, 1} depends only on signals x1, . . . , xt.
Let Lt = {x : sτ (x1, . . . , xτ ) = 1 for all τ = 1, . . . , t} and lt(θ) = Pr(x
j ∈ Lt | θ).
Similarly, as in Section 3.2, variables θ, l1, . . . , lT are mutually dependent and any of them
can be chosen as independent variable determining other T variables. As before, Ut(x) =
E [ut (θ, l1, . . . , lT ) | x1, . . . , xt] is the expected payoff of type x in round t, conditional on
her information at t.
We again consider a symmetric strategy profile that satisfies the properties of Diagonal
Monotonicity P1, Extreme Behavior P2, and Optimality in the Continuation Play P3.18
To define the last property, we introduce a value function Vt(x) by VT+1 = 0, and
Vt(x) = Ut(x) + st+1(x) · Vt+1(x) for all t = T, . . . , 1.
The property P3 requires that st(x) = 1 if and only if Vt(x) ≥ 0, for all t ≥ 2.
Finally, let D1 = E[u1 | x
∗
1] and
Dt = E[s2(x) · . . . · st(x) · Ut(x) | x
∗
1];
it is the expectation of the payoff for stage t ≥ 2 as formed in round 1 by the threshold
type x∗1, taking into account the exit options.
The next theorem extends the generalized Laplacian Property to settings with multiple
exit possibilities.
Theorem 3. Payoff expectations formed by threshold type x∗1 in round 1 are equal to










ut(θ(lt), l1(lt), . . . , lT (lt)) dlt. (8)
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 10, which is a general-
ization Lemma 1 (the statement and the proof of Lemma 10 is in Appendix A.5). As for
17To unify the terminology, if the agent stays in all rounds, we say that she exits in round T + 1 with
payoff of the above form.
18The properties P1 and P2 can be generalized in a straightforward manner. In equilibrium, the prop-
erties follow from assumptions analogous to Strict State Monotonicity A1, Weak Action Monotonicity
A2, and Dominance Regions A3.
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Lemma 2, note that its proof is not restricted to 2-dimensional signals. It applies for any
dimension with analogous definition of a diagonally monotone set and its boundary.19
Applying Lemma 10 to the value function, we obtain that for all t = 2, . . . , T :
E[st(x) · Vt(x) | ∂Lt−1] = E[Vt(x) | ∂Lt].
Notice the relationship to Lemma 1: when T = t = 2 the last equation gives E[s1(x) ·
U2(x) | ∂L1] = E[U2(x) | ∂L2] — the statement of Lemma 1.
By the Optimality in the Continuation Play P3, the left hand side of (8) equals
E[V1(x) | ∂L1]. This in turn equals the right-hand side of (8), as follows from the
following decomposition:
E[Vt(x) | ∂Lt] = E[Ut(x) | ∂Lt] + E[st+1(x) · Vt+1(x) | ∂Lt]
= E[Ut(x) | ∂Lt] + E[Vt+1(x) | ∂Lt+1].
Applying this decomposition recursively for t = 1, . . . , T − 1, we obtain E[V1(x) | ∂L1] =
∑T
t=1 E[Ut(x) | ∂Lt]. This is indeed equal to the right-hand side of (8), as for each t we
have
E[Ut(x) | ∂Lt] = E[E[ut(θ, l1, . . . , lT ) | x1, . . . , xt] | ∂Lt]
= E[ut(θ, l1, . . . , lT ) | ∂Lt] =
∫ 1
0
ut(θ(lt), l1(lt), . . . , lT (lt)) dlt,
using the law of iterated expectations and Lemma 2.
The effects of reversibility described in Table 1 apply also in the setting with multiple
rounds. We give a brief argument for this comparison, which is again based on mono-
tonicity of the payoff functions and on the inequalities l1 ≥ l2 ≥ · · · ≥ lT . We extend the






st(lt), lt, . . . , lt) dlt and we again
use mst = S1 + · · · + ST for the threshold investment incentive in the static game. As
before, the payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers if ut(θ, l1, . . . , lT ) does not depend
on lt+1, . . . , lT for all t = 1, . . . , T − 1. The payoffs do not exhibit forward spillovers if
ut(θ, l1, . . . , lT ) does not depend on l1, . . . , lt−1 for all t = 2, . . . , T . In the former case we










1, lt, . . . , lt, lt) dlt.
When σ is small, this implies that mdyn ≥ mst. On the other hand, in the latter case we












1, lt, . . . , lt, lt) dlt.
Again, for σ small we obtain that mdyn ≤ mst, leading to the same comparative results
as in the setting with two rounds.
7 Discussion of the model
Let us briefly discuss the main modeling assumptions.
Uninformative prior. The uninformative prior together with the independence of errors
with respect to θ imply that local properties of the information structure are independent
of the realized value of θ. That is, for two realizations of the fundamental θ and θ′, con-
ditional density of x|θ is a translation of the conditional density of x|θ′. This translation
invariance, which drives the Laplacian property, would be distorted by an informative
prior. However, in the limit of small noise, as σ → 0, any prior becomes approximately
uninformative compared to informativeness of the signals. We conjecture our results re-
main valid under any prior in the limit of small noise. See Frankel, Morris and Pauzner
(2003) for formalization of this idea for static global games.
Fixed fundamental. We assumed that the fundamental θ is fixed throughout the game. We
abstract from the fluctuations in θ because learning alone suffices to induce positive value
to the reversibility option, and the arguments behind the generalized Laplacian property
are orthogonal to the fluctuations. We conjecture that the generalized Laplacian property
remains valid in a randomly evolving environment.
Social learning. Let us discuss micro-foundations for our exogenous learning process
in terms of social learning. The following modeling approach is often used in dynamic
global games.20 In our baseline model, agents receive additional information about θ in
round 2, whereas the early investment level l1 is unobserved. However, the agents can
in equilibrium deduce additional information about l1 from the signal x
i
2: If all agents
use a monotone strategy with threshold x∗1 in round 1, then θ and l1 are related by the







, where F1 is the c.d.f. of the first-round error η
i
1.
We can reverse the perspective and formulate an alternative model in which the
primary source of information in round 2 is a noisy observation of l1 and agents deduce
information about θ only indirectly. Assume in this alternative that agents in round 1
observe fundamental-based signal xi1 = θ + ση
i
1 as in the baseline setup, but instead of
the round 2 signal xi2 = θ + ση
i
2, agents observe a noisy aggregate statistic of the round
20It was first used in Dasgupta (2007), and later used in Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2007), Angeletos
and Werning (2006), and in Goldstein, Ozdenoren and Yuan (2011).
23
1 actions. The following specification is used in the literature for tractability reasons:
yi = 1− F−11 (1− l1) + η
i
2. (9)
In a symmetric monotone equilibrium, the observation of yi is equivalent to the obser-
vation of xi2 = θ + ση
i
2 because an agent observing y
i can compute xi2 in the equilib-
rium. Hence, the unique symmetric monotone equilibria coincide across our model with





































Figure 7: Variant of the dynamic game in which agents can delay investment.
Exit vs. delay option. We assumed that investment is reversible and that the safe action
is irreversible. We have also examined a complementary variant of the dynamic game
in which the investing is irreversible, whereas not investing is reversible — agents may
delay investment, as in Figure 7. The two variants of the dynamic game can be mapped
to each other by a careful relabeling of the actions, so we report only the analysis of the
first variant. The studied effects, however, turn out to have opposite signs across the two
games. To understand why, recall that the effects in the game with the exit option are
driven by the technological constraint l2 ≤ l1. The opposite inequality l2 ≥ l1 holds in
the variant with the delay option as agents who have not invested in round 1 can join
the project in round 2. For this reason the first- and second-stage effects attain opposite
signs. See Table 1 from the introduction for a summary and comparison.
Both actions reversible. Last, we have limited our analysis to setups with one reversible
action. In the working version of this paper from 2008 we sketch an extension of the gener-
alized Laplacian property to setups with many rounds and many options. Full generality
of the Laplacian property and evaluation of the strategic consequences of reversibility
options in general environments still remains an opportunity for future research.21
21One of the authors continues to examine the broad research topic of coordination and learning in a
complementary paper of Mathevet and Steiner (2011). The two papers differ in the specification of the
dynamic global game and in the techniques used in the analysis.
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8 Conclusion
Economically relevant coordination problems are rarely static. Typically, they are dy-
namic processes in which economic agents can postpone irreversible decisions in order
to acquire additional information. We develop a modeling framework that incorporates
learning and (ir)reversibility, while maintaining analytical tractability. The model allows
for a qualitative assessment of the reversibility effects based solely on two features ob-
servable by an outside modeler. The first relevant feature is the (ir)reversibility of actions
available to the economic agents. The second feature is the direction of the intertemporal
payoff spillovers in between different stages of the coordination process. Based on these
two features, the modeler or a policy maker can assess the effects of the reversibility
option as summarized in Table 1 on page 4.
The applicability of this dynamic framework can be demonstrated on the economic
problem of creditor panic, discussed in the introduction. A large set of agents simulta-
neously decide whether to lend a fixed amount for a joint risky project. The agents can
withdraw the investment in the interim stage of the project, or roll over the debt until
its maturity. Such interaction corresponds to our model with reversible investment and
an irreversible safe action, which conforms to the left column in Table 1. It is conceiv-
able that the project exhibits forward payoff spillovers as high investment in the early
stage may ceteris paribus increase profits in the late stage of the project due to inertia
in the production process. On the contrary, backward spillovers are unlikely because the
instantaneous profit from the first stage is presumably not causally influenced by the
investment level in the later stage. Such a structure of payoff spillovers corresponds to
the second row of Table 1. As the table specifies, the provision of an exit option enhances
efficient coordination in this case. Although, as emphasized by Morris and Shin (2004),
the exit option could lead to inefficient runs in the interim stage, this is, in this case,
more than offset by the valuable flexibility provided by the option.
The conclusion is reversed if, preserving the structure of the payoff spillovers, agents
have the option to delay investment instead of the exit option.22 As seen in the right
column of Table 1, the delay option hampers efficient coordination in this case. These
strategic consequences of the reversibility options could not be discussed in the original
model of the creditor panic by Morris and Shin (2004). To fit the static global games
framework, the authors kept the entry decisions exogenous, thus ignoring the intertem-
poral link between the first- and second-stage decisions on which this paper focuses.
In other cases, the structure of the payoff spillovers differs. In some applications
of regime change games, the success of the attack and the payoffs for participation in
the early and late wave of the attack depend only on the final size of the attack l2 (as
assumed in the main version of the model in Dasgupta 2007). In such cases the payoffs
22Heidhues and Melissas (2006), Section 3.2 falls into this category.
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exhibit backward but no forward spillovers, the delay option enhances and the exit option
hampers efficient coordination.
A Proofs
We first introduce additional notation describing the error distributions. The supports of
the marginal distributions of ηit are, without loss of generality,
23 assumed to be symmetric
intervals [−ht, ht] where ht ∈ (0, 1]. The joint density and the c.d.f. of the error pair
(η1, η2) are denoted f and F , respectively. The marginal c.d.f. of η
i
t is denoted Ft. In




1 denotes the difference of the errors. The support of η
i
∆ is [η∆, η∆]
where η
∆
= min(η1,η2)∈H(η2−η1) and η∆ = max(η1,η2)∈H(η2−η1). We denote the marginal








η2 − η1 = η∆
η2 − η1 = η∆
0
Figure 8: Notation describing error distributions.
A.1 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Theorem 1 (Morris and Shin 2003). The theorem relies on three properties of
the information structure. Errors ηi1 are independent across agents, independent of θ,
and the agents hold uninformative prior belief about θ.
The following computation verifies that the threshold type has the uniform strategic
23If the supports of the marginal distributions were not symmetric around 0, agents would subtract
an appropriate constant from their signals when forming posterior beliefs.
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belief; she assigns probability z to the event that the aggregate action l1 falls below z:
Pr
(












































































= E [u2 (θ, l1, l2) | ∂L2] . (10)
Let
Ks = {x2 ∈ [x
∗
1 + η∆, x
∗
1 + η∆] : s2(x
∗
1, x2) = 1} and
Ke = {x2 ∈ [x
∗
1 + η∆, x
∗
1 + η∆] : s2(x
∗
1, x2) = 0}
be the sets of the second-round signals x2 such that type (x
∗
1, x2) stays in, respectively
exits the project.
We prove (10) by showing that both its left- and right-hand side are equal to
∫
Ke







1, x2) dF∆(x2 − x
∗
1). (11)
We will use that η∆ = x2 − x1 is independent of the events ∂L1 and ∂L2, and therefore
the conditional distribution of η∆|∂Lt equals the unconditional distribution F∆. This
independence will be demonstrated at the end of the proof.
The left-hand side of (10) equals (11) because s2(x
∗
1, x2) = 0 for x2 ∈ Ke, s2(x
∗
1, x2) = 1
for x2 ∈ Ks, and the c.d.f. of x2|∂L1 is F∆(x2 − x
∗
1).
We now focus on the right-hand side of (10). By the law of iterated expectations, the
right-hand side of (10) is E [E [u2 (θ, l1, l2) | x
i] | ∂L2] = E [U2 (x
i) | ∂L2].
For each x′2 ∈ [x
∗
1 + η∆, x
∗
1 + η∆], define x(x
′
2) as the intersection of ∂L2 with the line
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1. The intersection exists and is unique.
24 We split the expectation











The first integral is identical to the first integral in (11) because if x2 ∈ Ke then x(x2)
satisfies the indifference condition in round 2, U2(x(η∆)) = 0. To see this, note that type
(x∗1, x2) exits and thus is not contained in L2. Then, by the monotonicity property P2,
x(x2) is in the interior of L1. Thus in any neighborhood of x(x2) there exist x
′ and x′′
such that s2(x
′) = 0 and s2(x
′′) = 1. Strategy s2(x) is optimal in round 2 (property
P3) and hence U2(x
′) ≤ 0, U2(x
′′) ≥ 0. Then U2(x(x2)) = 0 from the continuity of
expectations with respect to the signals. The second integral in (12) is identical to the
second integral in (11) because if x2 ∈ Ks then x(x2) = (x
∗
1, x2) as the type (x
∗
1, x2) lies
on the boundary of L2.
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We now complete the proof by showing that ηi1, η
i





are independent of the events ∂L1 and ∂L2. The argument applies not only to the
boundaries of Lt but to boundary of any diagonally monotone set S. Let Td(S) be a
translation operator that translates a set S ⊆ X in the direction of diagonal: Td(S) =
{x ∈ X : x− (d, d) ∈ S}. We consider diagonal translations Td(∂Lt). The uninformative
prior and the independence of errors from θ imply that the conditional joint distribution
of errors is invariant to diagonal translations: (ηi1, η
i









d ∈ R. Hence, the distribution of (ηi1, η
i
2) | (x
i ∈ Td(∂Lt)) is identical for each d and thus
also equal to the unconditional distribution of (ηi1, η
i
2).
Proof of Lemma 2. For each type x ∈ X, define d(x) as such d ∈ R for which x ∈ Td(∂S)
(see the proof of Lemma 1 for the definition of the translation operator Td). We interpret
d(x) as a “distance” of x from ∂S in the diagonal direction.
Let us consider virtual private signals x̃i = d(xi) and virtual errors η̃i = x̃i − θ. The
virtual information structure inherits all three properties that are sufficient for the static
Laplacian property (Theorem 1). (i) θ is drawn from the uniform distribution (ii) The
virtual errors η̃i are independent across agents, and (iii) independent of θ. The properties
(ii) and (iii) hold because, by the construction, the virtual error η̃it can be expressed as a
function of (ηi1, η
i




2) satisfy those properties.
Let x̃∗ = 0. From the definition of the virtual signals, event x̃i = x̃∗ is identical to the
event xi ∈ ∂S and type x lies in (the closure of) S, if and only if x̃i ≥ x̃∗. See Figure 5




1) ∈ L2. For
sufficiently low x1, x1 < x
∗




1) /∈ L1 ⊇ L2. The uniqueness follows from the
monotonicity property P1; each line parallel to the diagonal intersects ∂L2 once.
25To see this, notice that s2(x
∗
1, x2) = 1 by the definition of Ks; therefore (x
∗
1, x2) ∈ L2. On the other
hand, (x∗1 − δ, x2 − δ) /∈ L1 ⊇ L2 for any δ > 0.
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for an illustration. Therefore, the conditional random variable lS(θ) | ∂S is identical to
Pr
(







and the last conditional random variable is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] by the static
Laplacian property, Theorem 1.
A.2 Proofs for Section 4
The continuation game Γ2(x
∗
1) is a static Bayesian game in which agents i ∈ [0, 1] observe
their types xi ∈ X and simultaneously choose strategy s2 : X −→ {0, 1}. The joint
distribution of (θ, x1, x2) is as in the dynamic game. The payoff of type x choosing action
s2(x) is s2(x) · u2 (θ, l1(θ), l2(θ)) where l1(θ), l2(θ) are, as before, the first and the second
stage investment levels defined in the dynamic game, when all agents follow threshold x∗1
in round 1 and strategy profile (si2)i in round 2.
We define rationalizable strategies in the continuation game as follows. Strategy
profile in Γ2(x
∗
1) is a mapping Σ2(i) specifying strategy s
i
2 for each agent i. The best
response set BR2(x,Σ2) ⊆ {0, 1} of type x against profile Σ2 contains action 1 if
E [u2(θ, l1, l2) | x] ≥ 0 and action 0 if E [u2(θ, l1, l2) | x] ≤ 0 under Σ2. We let S
0
2 de-
note the set of all strategies, and define Sk2 recursively for k = 1, 2, . . . : strategy s2 ∈ S
k
2
if and only if (i) s2 ∈ S
k−1
2 , and (ii) for each type x ∈ X there exists profile Σ2 such that
Σ2(i) ∈ S
k−1






Let s1 be the threshold strategy in round 1 with threshold x
∗
1. The following lemma
is an auxiliary result used in the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 5. For each x∗1 ∈ R, the continuation game Γ2(x
∗
1) has a unique rationalizable
strategy s2. Pair (s1, s2) satisfies properties P1, P2, and P3 from Section 3.
Proof of Lemma 5. For convenience, we let σ = 1.
We first construct the largest and smallest rationalizable strategies using a contagion
argument and then show that they coincide by an adaptation of the translation argument
from Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2003).
In the first step we analyze the maximal and the minimal rationalizable strategy in
Γ2(x
∗
1). See van Zandt and Vives (2007) for general characterization of extreme ratio-
nalizable strategies in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities. Our problem
differs in certain details of the setting, such as continuous vs. discrete set of agents, and
so we give a direct argument.
For a symmetric strategy profile (s1, s2), let L1 = {x ∈ X : s1(x1) = 1}, I2 = {x ∈
X : s2(x) = 1}, and define Ũ2(x, L1, I2) = E[u2(θ, l1, l2) | x] to be the expected second




2 = ∅, and I
(0)



























The interpretation of these sets is as follows. Action 1 is unique rationalizable action in
Γ2(x
∗
1) on types in I
(k)
2 and 0 is unique rationalizable action in Γ2(x
∗








2 are diagonally mono-





















2 . Action 1 is the unique rationalizable action on I2 and 0 is





sets I2, I2 are diagonally monotone sets and I2 ⊇ I2.
The second step of the proof adapts the translation argument of Frankel, Morris, and
Pauzner (2003). We prove that the sets I2 and I2 have identical boundaries, ∂I2 = ∂I2.
Suppose for contradiction that ∂I2 6= ∂I2.
Let us first recall notation introduced at the beginning of the Appendix: ηi∆ ∈ [η∆, η∆]
denotes errors’ difference ηi2− η
i







let functions x : [η
∆
, η∆] −→ ∂I2 and x : [η∆, η∆] −→ ∂I2 denote the intersections of the
line x2 − x1 = η∆ with ∂I2 and ∂I2, respectively.
By Milgrom and Roberts (1990), the largest and the smallest rationalizable strategy
each constitutes a symmetric equilibrium in Γ2(x
∗
1). Hence, the types x(η∆) and x(η∆)





x(η∆) ≥ x(η∆) for all η∆ because the sets I2, I2 are diagonally monotone sets and
I2 ⊆ I2.
As the last property, note that the functions x(η∆), x(η∆) are continuous. Consider
x(η∆) at η0, denote x0 = x(η0),
26 and let
U(x) = Ũ2(x, L1, I2).
Then U(x0 − (ε/2, ε/2)) < 0 < U(x0 + (ε/2, ε/2)) by assumptions A1 and A2. Using the
continuity of payoff expectations with respect to signals, there exists δ ∈ (0, ε/2) such
that for all δ ∈ (−δ, δ) the following inequalities hold:
U(x0 − (ε/2, ε/2) + (−δ, δ)) < 0 < U(x0 + (ε/2, ε/2) + (−δ, δ)). (13)
Moreover, both x0 ± (ε/2, ε/2) + (−δ, δ) ∈ B, where B is a ball with radius ε around
x0.. Consider now η such that |η − η0| < δ and let δ = η − η0. Then it follows from
26The proof for x(η∆) is similar.
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(13) and monotonicity with respect to ε that x(η) = U(x0 + (ε
′, ε′) + (−δ, δ)) for some
ε′ ∈ (−ε/2, ε/2). This, in turn, implies that x(η) ∈ B, which completes the proof of the
continuity.
Next, we define function ζ : [η
∆
, η∆] −→ [0,+∞) as ζ(η∆) = x1(η∆) − x1(η∆) where
x1, x1 are the first coordinates of x, x. Notice that ζ(η∆) ≥ 0 for all η∆ because x1(η∆) ≥
x1(η∆). The function ζ is continuous and hence it attains a maximum on the compact
set [η
∆
, η∆] at some value η̂∆. The maximal value ζ(η̂∆) is strictly positive if and only if
the boundaries ∂I2 and ∂I2 differ.
Similarly to U(x), let








where T is the translation operator along the diagonal, as defined in the proof of Lemma 1
(Td(S) is translation of the set S by vector (d, d)).
We now establish two inequalities. By construction, Tζ(η̂∆)(I2) is a subset of the
closure of I2 and therefore by action monotonicity
U
′
(x) ≤ U(x), (14)





x− ζ(η̂∆) · (1, 1)
)
(15)
because type x under I2 = Tζ(η̂∆)(I2) has identical belief about the aggregate action in
round 2 as type x− ζ(η̂∆) · (1, 1) under I2 = I2, but the belief of the latter about (θ, l1)
is stochastically dominated (in the sense of the first order stochastic dominance) by the
belief about (θ, l1) of the former type; strict inequality holds because u2 increases in θ.
Finally, consider the type x(η̂∆) = x(η̂∆)+ ζ(η̂∆) · (1, 1). The types x(η̂∆), and x(η̂∆)
satisfy the indifference conditions, and hence U(x(η̂∆)) = 0, U(x(η̂∆)) = 0. On one hand,
using inequality (14), U
′
(x(η̂∆)) ≤ U(x(η̂∆)) = 0, but on the other hand, by inequality
(15), U
′
(x(η̂∆)) > U(x(η̂∆)) = 0, which establishes the contradiction.
Additionally, notice that the unique rationalizable strategy s2 in Γ2(x
∗
1) attains 1 for
sufficiently high types; the existence of the upper dominance region assures that action
1 is dominant for sufficiently high types in Γ2(x
∗
1).
Proof of Lemma 3. We again let σ = 1 in this proof. We obtain mdyn(x
∗
1) > 0 for
sufficiently high x∗1 and mdyn(x
∗
1) < 0 for sufficiently low x
∗
1 by the existence of the
dominance regions.
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1) as defined for the continuation game Γ2(x
∗
1) in the proof of Lemma 5.
27
Assume x′1 > x
∗




1. We prove by induction that I2(x
′
1) ⊇ Td (I2(x
∗
1)).


























































by the strict state monotonicity A1. Second, by the action monotonicity A2 and by the
induction assumption, the right hand side is smaller or equal than
Ũ2
(









































and, using definition of I
(k+1)













We have established I2(x
′






1) for t = 1, 2





1) dominate round 1 belief at signal x
∗












1) is increasing in x
∗
1.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows from Lemmas 3 and 5.
A.3 Auxiliary Results for Section 5
Before proving Propositions 2 and 3 we formulate and prove Lemmas 6, 7, 8 and 9 on
the limiting behavior of the static and dynamic games when σ → 0.
Lemma 6. The limit m∗dyn(x
∗
1) = limσ→0 mdyn(x
∗
1; σ) exists, is continuous and increasing
in x∗1.










27We highlight the dependence on the round 1 threshold by the additional argument.
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As ηi2 and η
i
∆ are independent, the set H is a parallelogram and η∆ = −η∆ = h1 − h2.
When xi2 is sufficient statistic, agent i’s decision in round 2 depends only on x
i
2 and not
on xi1. Thus, s2(x
i
2) is a monotone function R −→ {0, 1} with a threshold denoted by x
∗
2.







For the purpose of this proof we need more precise but more elaborate notation
describing mappings between θ, l1 and l2. Let ϑt(lt; x
∗
1, σ) be the inverse function of
lt(θ; x
∗
1, σ) with respect to θ. Omitting the dependence on x
∗
1 and σ, let λ1(l2) = l1(ϑ2(l2))
denote investment level l1 as a function of l2. Similarly, λ2(l1) = l2(ϑ1(l1)).
We divide the proof into three cases depending on the value of x∗1.
Case (a). If u2(x
∗
1, 0, 0) > 0, then u2(x
∗
1 − σh1, 0, 0) > 0 for sufficiently small σ.
Then, all types with xi1 ≥ x
∗
1 strictly prefer to stay in the project in the continuation
game Γ2(x
∗
1; σ). Thus, l1(θ; x
∗
1, σ) = l2(θ; x
∗
1, σ) and so mdyn(x
∗




































1 + σ(h1 + h2) when σ is sufficiently
small. Suppose the opposite inequality, x∗2(σ) < x
∗
1 + σ(h1 + h2). Then, for type x who






1 + σ(h1 + 2h2), 1, l2)dl2, (16)
The above inequality is based on three observations. First, an agent with signal x∗2 in
round 2 knows that the fundamental does not exceed the value x∗2 + σh2 < x
∗
1 + σ(h1 +
h2) + σh2 = x
∗
1 + σ(h1 + 2h2). Second, the investment level l1 can be at most 1. Third,
the second round belief about l2 of the agent who observes x
∗
2 is stochastically dominated
by the uniform distribution on [0, 1], as only fellow agents who observe second round
signal xi2 ≥ x
∗
2 can possibly participate in the second stage. The right-hand side of (16)
is negative for sufficiently small σ, which contradicts the indifference condition that the




1 + σ(h1 + h2) for small σ.
The last inequality implies that the types with xi1 = x
∗
1 do not reach action path 11 in
Γ2(x
∗
1; σ), and hence D2(x
∗
1; σ) = 0. Moreover, ϑ1(l1; x
∗
1, σ) ≤ x
∗
1 + σh1 for all l1 ∈ (0, 1).




1+σh1) = 0 because we established that agents
with the second signal at most x∗1 + σ(h1 + h2) do not invest in the continuation game
Γ2(x
∗
1; σ). Thus, λ2(l1) = 0 for all l1 ∈ (0, 1) and for sufficiently small σ.
Case (c). Consider the case when u2(x
∗





1, 1, l2)dl2. This case










= a1 + η














1, σ) depends only on a1 and η
∗. To see this, recall that l1(θ; x
∗
1, σ) = Pr(x
i
1 ≥









, and thus, l1(x
∗
1 − σa1; x
∗
1, σ) = Pr(η
i




1 − σa1; x
∗
1, σ) = Pr(η
i
1 ≥ a1 and η
i
2 ≥ a1 + η
∗) = F̃ (a1, a1 + η
∗).
Agent receiving the threshold signal x∗2 in round 2 is indifferent between actions 0 and
1. In the above notation, and after transformation θ = x∗1 − σ(a2 − η
∗), the indifference






x∗1 − σ(a2 − η), F̃ (a2 − η,−h2), F̃ (a2 − η, a2)
)
f2(a2) da2 = 0. (17)
Observe that for σ > 0, function J(η; σ) is increasing and continuous in η and due to
the existence of dominance regions, it attains both positive and negative values. Thus,
for every σ > 0 there exists unique η = η∗(σ) such that J(η; σ) = 0. For σ = 0: J(η; 0)
is increasing in η as well, by the strict monotonicity of u2 in l2. Therefore, the equation
J(η; 0) = 0 has at most one solution.
Now, for η = −(h1 + h2) and for all a2 ≥ −h2, we have F̃ (a2 − η,−h2) = F̃ (a2 −
η, a2) = 0. Moreover, for η = h1 + h2 and a2 ≤ h2, we have F̃ (a2 − η,−h2) = 1 and
F̃ (a2 − η, a2) = Pr(η
i














1, 1, l2)dl2 = J(h1 + h2; 0).
Therefore, the equation J(η; 0) = 0 has indeed a unique solution and that solution lies in
the interval [−(h1+h2), h1+h2]; denote it η
∗∗. It follows that limσ→0 η
∗(σ) = η∗∗ and η∗∗
is continuous and decreasing in x∗1, for x
∗
1 such that u2(x
∗






Let us now study limσ→0 Dt(x
∗
1; σ), for the range of x
∗
1 considered in (c). In order to
study limσ→0 D1(x
∗
1; σ), let us first denote F̃
−1
1 (l) the inverse function to F̃ (z,−h2) with


























. Note that the latter is non-increasing























exists, is continuous in x∗1, and is increasing in x
∗
1. The monotonicity is strict by the
assumption of the strict state monotonicity A1.
Similarly, if we denote F̃−12 (l, η) the inverse function to F̃ (z, z + η) with respect to


















for x∗1 considered in the case (c). Therefore, also the limit
D∗2(x
∗
1) = limσ→0 D2(x
∗







decreasing because we established in the Proof of Lemma 3 that D2(x
∗
1; σ) increases in
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1) exists, is continuous in




1 in the range considered in case (c).
Summing up, we have established that the limit m∗dyn(x
∗
1) is continuous in x
∗
1 for
ranges of x∗1 considered in all the three cases (a), (b), and (c). Moreover, in case (c),
η∗∗ = −(h1 + h2) if u2(x
∗
1, 0, 0) = 0, and η





1, 1, l2)dl2 = 0. This
implies that m∗dyn(x
∗
1) continuously connects at the boundaries in between the cases (a)
and (c), and in between cases (c) and (b).
Lemma 7. (i) Action path 11 is selected at θ∗ in Γst if and only if m
∗
st(θ
∗) > 0. Action




(ii) Action 11 or 10 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn if and only if m
∗
dyn(θ
∗) > 0. Action 0 is




Proof of Lemma 7. Claim (i) follows directly from Proposition 2.1 in Morris and Shin
(2003) and from the assumption of bounded errors.
Claim (ii). By continuity of m∗dyn, if m
∗
dyn(θ
∗) > 0 then m∗dyn(θ) is positive on some
δ-neighborhood of θ∗. Together with the monotonicity of mdyn(θ; σ) with respect to θ it
implies that mdyn(θ; σ) is positive in a δ-neighborhood of θ
∗ for σ < σ, for some σ > 0.
For sufficiently small σ all agents receive signals xi1 above θ
∗ − δ in round 1 of Γdyn(σ)
whenever Nature draws fundamental θ∗. Then, by Proposition 1, all agents play action 1
in round 1 in the unique monotone symmetric equilibrium of Γdyn(σ) (whenever Nature
draws θ∗).
A symmetric argument implies that if m∗dyn(θ
∗) < 0 then action 0 is selected.
Function m∗dyn(θ) has a unique root at which none of the actions is selected in round
1 of Γdyn. Hence the reverse implications hold as well.
Let us now introduce and remind notation used in the proofs that follow; see Figure
9. Let x2(x
∗
1; σ) = x
∗
1 + σ(h1 + h2). If agent receives x2(x
∗
1; σ) in round 2, then she knows
that all the fellow agents have received signals at least x∗1 in round 1. As before, L2(x
∗
1; σ)
is the set of types who reach action path 11 if they play the rationalizable strategy in the
continuation game Γ2(x
∗
1; σ), and x(η; σ) is the intersection of ∂L2(x
∗
1; σ) with the line
x2−x1 = ση, where η ∈ [η∆, η∆]. (The notation omits dependence of x(η; σ) on x
∗
1.) Let
x2(η; σ) be the second coordinate of x(η; σ). We will pay attention to the round 2 signal
x2(η∆; σ) which has the following property implied by the monotonicity of s2: all types
(x1, x2) ∈ X such that x1 ≥ x
∗
1 and x2 ≥ x2(η∆; σ) reach action path 11 in Γ2(x
∗
1; σ).





1, 1, l2)dl2 > 0. Then there exists σ > 0 such that x2(η∆; σ) < x2(x
∗














Figure 9: Additional notation.
Proof of Lemma 8. Suppose the contrary. Then there exists a sequence σk → 0 such
that x2(η∆; σk) ≥ x2(x
∗
1; σk) for all k. Let us explore beliefs of the type x(η∆; σk). First,
she knows that θ ≥ x∗1 − σkh1. Second, she knows that l1 = 1 because only fellow
agents’ signals at least x∗1 are compatible with her second signal which is x2(x
∗
1; σk) or
larger. Third, her belief about l2 stochastically dominates the uniform distribution on
[0, 1]. This is because all agents with xi2 > x2(η∆; σk) invest in both rounds and an agent
receiving xi2 = x2(η∆; σk) has the uniform belief about the proportion of agents with the
second signal above x2(η∆; σk). Using all three observations we get





1 − σkh1, 1, l2)dl2. (18)






is continuous in x∗1. This contradicts the indifference condition U2 (x(η∆; σk)) = 0.
Lemma 9. If strategic uncertainty permits investment at θ∗ in round 2 and m∗dyn(θ
∗) > 0,
then action path 11 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn.
Proof of Lemma 9. (See page 35 for notation.) As m∗dyn is continuous, m
∗
dyn(θ
∗ − δ) > 0
for some δ > 0. By Lemma 7, action path 11 or 10 is selected at θ∗ − δ. Thus, there
exists σ > 0 such that for σ < σ all agents invest in round 1 of Γdyn(σ) for all signals
xi1 ≥ θ




∗ − δ, 1, l2)dl2 > 0, we have s2 (θ
∗ − δ, x2(θ
∗ − δ; σ)) = 1 in the unique equilibrium
of Γdyn(σ).
If Nature draws fundamental θ∗ then types of all agents exceed (θ∗−σh1, θ
∗−σh2). We




and so that all agents invest in both rounds.
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A.4 Proofs for Section 5





1; σ) for any x
∗








1) for all x
∗
1.





∗). By Lemma 9, action path 11 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn because we assumed that
strategic uncertainty permits investment at θ in round 2.




∗) and hence 0 is
selected at θ∗ in Γst.








which is established below.




st(θ) and so 11 is
selected at θ in Γst.




dyn(θ) and hence 0 is
selected at θ in Γdyn.





1, 1, l2)dl2 > 0 and payoffs do not exhibit
forward spillovers then inequality (19) holds.
By Lemma 8, agents reach action path 11 in Γ2(x
∗
1; σ) whenever their round 2 signal
exceeds x2(x
∗
1; σ). Hence if Nature draws θ > x2(x
∗
1; σ)+σh2 = x
∗
1+σ(h1+2h2) all agents
reach action path 11 in Γ2(x
∗
1; σ).
Recall that we have defined ϑt(lt; x
∗
1, σ) as the inverse function to the investment
profile lt(θ) induced by the rationalizable strategy in Γ2(x
∗
1; σ). Notice that ϑt(lt; x
∗
1, σ)
is non-decreasing in lt, and, as follows from the previous paragraph, ϑ2(l2; x
∗
1, σ) ≤ x
∗
1 +
















1 + 2σ(h1 + h2), σ), l2)dl2.
In the second inequality, we used x∗1 − σh1 ≤ ϑ1(l; x
∗
1, σ) for all l ∈ (0, 1). This holds
because l1(θ) = 0 for θ ≤ x
∗
1 − σh1.


















1 + 2σ(h1 + h2), σ), l1, l1)dl1.
Summing the two inequalities we get mdyn(x
∗
1; σ) ≤ mst(x
∗
1 + 2σ(h1 + h2); σ) and, as
σ → 0, the inequality (19).
A.5 Proof for Section 6
Lemma 10. Consider two closed diagonally monotone sets L ⊆ L′ ⊆ X and let s, s′ :
X −→ {0, 1} be their indicator functions. Assume that s = (s′, s) satisfies properties
P1 and P2. Consider a function U : X −→ R that is monotone in the sense of P1,
continuous on the interior of L′, and such that L = {x ∈ L′ : U(x) ≥ 0}. Then
E[s(x) · U(x) | ∂L′] = E[U(x) | ∂L]. (20)
Proof of Lemma 10. We decompose each of the expectations into two parts. Consider
first the left-hand side of (20) and recall that s is the indicator function of the set L:28
E[s(x) · U(x) | ∂L′] = Pr((X \ L) | ∂L′) · E[0 · U(x) | (X \ L) ∩ ∂L′]
+ Pr(L | ∂L′) · E[1 · U(x) | L ∩ ∂L′]. (21)
Note that the first term is zero.
Consider now the right-hand side of (20):
E[U(x) | ∂L] = Pr(intL′ | ∂L) · E[U(x) | intL′ ∩ ∂L]
+ Pr(L′′ | ∂L) · E[U(x) | L′′ ∩ ∂L], (22)
where intL′ = L′ \ ∂L′ and L′′ = X \ (intL′) = (X \ L′) ∪ ∂L′. We show that the first
term is again equal to zero and the second term is equal to the second term in (21). To
see the former, recall that L = {x ∈ L′ : U(x) ≥ 0}. Thus, by continuity, U(x) = 0 for
all x ∈ ∂L that lie in the interior of L′. For the latter, observe that both L′′ ∩ ∂L and
L ∩ ∂L′ are actually equal to ∂L ∩ ∂L′. Thus, the expectations in the second terms of
(21) and (22) are identical.
28We define Pr(L | ∂L′) = E[s(x) | ∂L′]. Also expectation conditional on L∩∂L′ is defined analogously
as in the text preceding Lemma 1.
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It remains to show that Pr(L | ∂L′) = Pr(L′′ | ∂L). Recall that
Pr(L | ∂L′) = lim
d→0
Pr(L | ∂L′d) = lim
d→0
Pr(L ∩ ∂L′d)/Pr(∂L′d).
Pr(L′′ | ∂L) = lim
d→0
Pr(L′′ | ∂Ld) = lim
d→0
Pr(L′′ ∩ ∂Ld)/Pr(∂Ld).
As argued in the proof of Lemma 1, the translational symmetry of the joint distribution
of θ and x implies that for any diagonally monotone set S, diagonal translations of ∂Sd
















for boundary of any diagonally monotone set.
Therefore, Pr(∂L′d) = Pr(∂Ld) and Pr(L ∩ ∂L′d) = Pr(L′′ ∩ ∂Ld), where the second
inequality holds as in fact L ∩ ∂L′d = Td(L
′′ ∩ ∂Ld). This completes the proof.
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